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Abstract: 
 
Purpose: The study attempts to explore the determinants of dividend smoothing behavior of 
firms by using firm’s specific characteristics, corporate governance and ownership structure 
variables as determinants of dividend smoothing in emerging markets due to their unique 
features from Western markets. The current study is undertaken to fill this gap in the 
literature.   
Design/methodology/approach: In order to achieve the research objectives penal data 
(2009-2018) of more than 1000 Asian firms were analyzed by using Statistical techniques 
such as pool, fixed and random models. 
Findings: Based on gender critical mass theory, the study finds that the presence of gender 
critical mass is positive and significantly associated with firm dividend smoothing behavior; 
whereas, presence of fewer women depicts negative or insignificant association with 
dividend smoothing behavior. Importantly, the study also finds moderating role of gender 
diversity between family ownership and firm’s dividend smoothing behavior. Furthermore, 
contrary to the agency theory based on explanations of dividend smoothing, firms with family 
ownership smooth dividend more in emerging markets.  
Practical implications: This paper helps out to the current as well as future potential 
investors to make better decision in such a changing economy as well as to help investors in 
selecting better investment opportunity to make their investment more profitable.  
Originality/value: The current study is the first of its kind to investigate dividend-smoothing 
behavior for more than 1000 firms of emerging Asian countries based on cross country 
analysis.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In the area of corporate finance, dividend behavior is considered an important topic 
of research, but we still do not have sufficient explanation for the dividend behavior 
of firms (Black, 1976).  It is one of the ten unresolved puzzles in corporate finance 
literature as we obtain different views in respect of its determinants. Some 
researchers believe that dividend is irrelevant (Miller and Modigliani, 1961) while 
others strongly favor the relevancy hypothesis (Lintner, 1956; Fama and Babiak 
1968;  Brav et al., 2005). It is not the dividend that has remained controversial but 
the assumptions about markets make dividend policy more complicated since we are 
suffering to have conclusive evidences in respect of dividend policy.   
 
Following Lintner (1956), Fama and Babiak (1968), numerous studies explored that 
firms prefer to distribute smooth dividends to its shareholders. The signaling 
hypothesis suggests that managers tend to smooth dividends relative to earnings; 
they increase dividend payout ratio only when they believe a significant and 
sustainable increase in firm’s earnings, they increase their dividend payments when 
they believe that earnings can sustain higher dividend levels permanently, and are 
reluctant to cut dividends except when adversative conditions are likely to persevere, 
as dividend cuts may be perceived as bad signal about firm’s performance and 
results in lower share price due to market negative response.  
 
The study confers with signaling hypothesis and relevancy theory of dividend 
payout. Despite of numerous studies relating to determinants of dividend smoothing 
behavior of the firms (Brav et al., 2005), the literature is unable to resolve the 
controversies among dividend smoothing determinants.  This controversy may stem 
from differences in investors’ horizon, market behavior, and the economic condition 
in which firm is operating or overall governance mechanism of the economy (Leary 
and Michaely, 2011). In addition, most of the studies focused on US and western 
market where the conditions are significantly different from emerging markets. 
  
Agency theory is used to explain and resolve issues in the relation between 
stockholders and their agents. Corporate governance represents a system of 
principles, policies, and evidently clear accountabilities and responsibilities used by 
shareholders to overawe the conflicts of interest inherent. It deals with defining ways 
to take active strategic measures to minimize the conflict of interests and added 
value to the firm. Dividend policy is used as a mechanism to reduce the agency 
conflicts, as per the substitute theory, which imitates minority-friendly comportment. 
Hence, shareholders can use governance mechanism to overcome the potential 
consequences of agency conflicts that may arise due to information asymmetry. It is 
quite imperative to investigate the role of important corporate governance 
determinants on dividend smoothing behavior of the firms. The pattern of 
shareholding significantly influences dividend smoothing behavior as the choices 
differ dramatically due to variation in tax brackets, control of firm’s assets, parental 
and subsidiary relation etc., the ownership structure has a significant role in dividend 
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smoothing in emerging markets due to family dominance, group affiliations and 
growing subsidiary pattern. At the same time, dispersed structures are less typical, 
though there are noteworthy differences between jurisdictions among Asian 
countries. While China and Vietnam, for instance, are categorized by sizable state 
ownership, while India and Korea preserve substantial family ownership structures. 
Accepting ownership structures in Asia is precarious to confirming the advance of 
operational corporate governance standards. So, it is very important to test 
ownership role in dividend smoothing behavior of emerging markets.  
    
The study has several significant contributions. First, it provides empirically the 
impacts of corporate governance and ownership structure on dividend smoothing 
behavior of firms in emerging markets.  Importantly, the study provides new 
evidence relating to significant role of gender diversity on firms’ smoothing 
behavior. The presence of female director on corporate board significantly impacts 
dividend smoothing and female presence can be used as a mechanism to address the 
information asymmetry problems in firms by distributing smooth dividend. For more 
conclusive evidence, the study also split into male and female CEO and findings 
show alternative mechanism approach may be used to alleviate the conflicts. 
Secondly, family ownership is a crucial factor among other factors of ownership 
structure, as valuable proportion of family owned firms in Asian region, we examine 
its impact on dividend smoothing. The moderating effect of board diversity between 
family ownership and dividend smoothing is examines by the current research. To 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first study investigating dividend-smoothing 
behavior for more than 1000 firms of emerging markets.  
 
The remaining article proceeds as follows: in the next section, we discuss previous 
studies regarding the relationship between various significant factors and dividend 
smoothing behavior and develop the hypothesis for our study. Data collection and 
various analysis techniques are mentioned in the third section. In the fourth section, 
results will be presented. Discussion and future recommendations will be in the last 
section.  
 
2. Theoretical Framework  
 
Dividend policy refers to the managerial decision on how much of a firm’s earnings 
are to be distributed to stockholders as dividends versus holding for reinvestment in 
future prospects. In general, there are three schools of thought in regards firm’s 
dividend policy (Damodaran, 2010). First, the dividend irrelevance theory proposes 
that dividend policy has no influence on market price of firm’s stock; henceforth the 
firm’s value in a perfect capital market remains unaffected (Miller and Modigliani, 
1961; Black and Scholes, 1974). Second school of thought takes into consideration 
the tax disadvantage and claims that dividends are not useful for stockholders who 
fall in higher tax bracket thus resulting lower stock prices (Brennan, 1970; Litzen 
berger and Ramaswamy, 1979). Finally, the bird-in-the-hand school of thought 
contends that dividends are encouraging as their payments results in an increase in 
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stockholders’ wealth through their influence on stock price (Harkavy, 1953; Gordon, 
1963; Pettit, 1972; Ball et al., 1979; Woolridge, 1983).  
 
In addition to these three schools of thoughts, the signaling theory states how the 
increments/cut of dividend payout convey good/bad signals to the stock markets 
associated with company’s future prospects (Miller and Rock, 1985) which 
ultimately explain into upward/downward movements of the stock value. As far as 
agency theory is concerned, dividend payments curtail agency costs between the 
management and shareholders (Moh’d et al., 1995). This view also states that 
dividend payment also reduces discretionary accrual that can be utilized with self-
interest by the management. In general, the study contents the dividend smoothing 
behavior of the Asian firms in context of agency theory, signaling theory and 
dividend relevancy aspects. Yet, it is not clear the factors that forces management to 
follow the aspect of dividend smoothing.  In this paper, we study whether board 
characteristic or ownership structure indeed impact dividend smoothing behavior of 
the firms in emerging markets. 
  
3. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
 
Various researchers have investigated different factors which influence the dividend 
smoothing of firms. The present study highlights some of the important factors of 
corporate governance (board size, board diversity) and ownership structure (family 
ownership, institutional ownership). Limited reviews of the prior studies regarding 
the relationship between the above mentioned factors and dividend smoothing are 
provided below. 
 
3.1 Firm’s Dividend Smoothing 
 
Since the seminal study by Lintner (1956), the phenomenon of dividend smoothing 
has been extensively studied. As, dividend changes may respond slowly to change in 
earnings, the management are reluctant to dividend cut and they are often ready to 
bear cost in order to avoid dividend cut even if the cost is significant. The evidences 
suggest that managers peruse dividend smoothing only because they are in belief 
that investors prefer smooth dividends. Lintner (1956) stated, “Dividend smoothing 
behavior was motivated by the belief on the part of many managements that most 
stockholders prefer a reasonably stable rate and that the market puts a premium on 
stability or gradual growth in rate.” In this vein, Brav, Graham, Harvey, and 
Michaely (2005) exhibited that executives are aware of a significant asymmetry 
between dividend cut and increases. Hence, they perceive a nominal reward for 
increasing dividends but a large penalty for dividend cut. So far, there is little (if 
any) empirical evidence in Asian context that describes the mechanism through 
which stockholders control management dividend smoothing behavior. Berk and 
DeMarzo (2013) stated that even more than fifty years after Lintner’s seminal work, 
we lack clear reason why firms smooth their dividends, nor convincing evidence 
relating to factors that influence dividend smoothing.  
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3.2 Corporate Governance and Dividend Smoothing 
 
According to Lazarides et al. (2009) corporate governance is a mechanism by which 
corporations are governed. Corporate governance primarily attempts to guard 
stockholders and then other stakeholders’ interest by making certain transparency 
and enforcing accountability. In the meantime, the dividend-paying behavior in 
emerging market is different from that of the western because of the difference in 
tax, information asymmetry and market volatility (AlKuwari, 2009; Wardhana et al., 
2014). There is a probability that dividend payout is more vulnerable in playing the 
monitoring role which ultimately enables minority stockholders to control managers 
discretionary action to avoid any manipulation in firm’s resources.   
 
As the literature depicts that higher and stable dividends are the most appropriate 
mechanism to control agency conflicts (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986) firms 
exposed to higher agency conflicts are more likely to follow higher degrees of 
dividend smoothing and the firms with weak governance mechanism tend to opt for 
a higher degree of dividend smoothing (Leary and Michaely, 2011; Javakhadze et 
al., 2014). Hence, we can conclude the dividend and agency conflicts can serve as 
substitute for each other. Conversely, it is also believed that stockholders are able to 
influence firms’ dividend policy by virtue of their strong shareholdings and 
influential role on the corporate board (Kowalewski, Stetsyuk and Talavera, 2007).  
 
They can force the management to pay stable dividend resulting dividend smoothing 
as an outcome of a strong corporate governance mechanism. Even and stable payout 
policies may have a two-way effect on firm. First, it reduces the chances of 
expropriation by managers while at the same time revealing the firm to the external 
financial market. Though, smoothing dividend may not act as barometers, yet it can 
also significantly reduce financial costs. For that reason, firm always prefer to strike 
the optimal dividend policy that results in an appropriate level of dividend 
smoothing by the firm. The literature however highlighted inconsistent views 
regarding dividend smoothing and corporate governance mechanism. In this vein, 
Javakhadze et al. (2014) reported that firms with strong governance mechanism 
exhibit less dividend smoothing behavior whereas Leary and Michaely (2011) 
provided evidence showing that weak governance results in less dividend smoothing 
policy in countries with poor shareholders protection rights. Based on earlier 
empirical works of Leary and Michaely (2011) and Javakhadze et al. (2014), the 
current study uses board characteristics and ownership structure as proxies for 
corporate governance mechanism.  Resultantly, the study extends on existing 
literature by including pertinent proxies of board characteristics (board size and 
board diversity) and ownership structure (family ownership and institutional 
ownership). 
 
3.2.1 Board Size and Firm’s Dividend Smoothing  
According to resource dependency theory, board size provides different resources to 
them and enables it to make timely and useful decisions. Similarly, as per agency 
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theory larger board is more likely to reduce agency conflicts between management 
and stakeholders by better monitoring and reducing information asymmetry. In this 
vein, there are empirical evidences that show positive and significant impacts of 
board size on dividend smoothing by affecting firm performance according to 
resource dependency theory and reducing agency conflicts as per agency maxim. 
Board of directors and its size makes significant efforts to reduce the agency 
problems and make better relations between management and stockholders. In 
contrast, some views that small typically produces better returns in comparison to 
larger-firms. Small boards are more likely to identify and act on poor performance of 
CEO. According to Bokpin, 2011, small board spends less time in discussions and is 
more likely to make timely decisions. 
 
The current study is mainly concerned with agency conflicts model, therefore, we 
confer positive association between board size and dividend smoothing behavior of 
the firms in Asia. This is in line with earlier findings (Bokpin, 2011; Batool and 
Javid 2014). It is also observed that large board size with more proportion of 
independent directors are supportive to increase dividend payments and at the same 
time helpful to mitigate agency conflict between management and shareholders 
(Afzal et al., 2009; Yarram and Dollery 2015). On the basis of these arguments, we 
hypnotized as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The board size has a significant positive influence on the dividend 
smoothing behavior of firms in emerging markets. 
 
3.2.2 Board Diversity and Dividend Smoothing  
In modern business, gender equality is one of the most important factors that 
promote ethics in corporate board. Board with gender diversity is more likely to 
have fewer agency conflicts. Good governance mechanism doesn’t call for dissent in 
the corporate board, but it often calls for gender diversity. Female presence on the 
corporate board is good, as it is beneficial for internal and external stakeholder. Its 
presence is more pronounced and useful in firms and markets where shareholders 
protection rights are on the lower side or/and agency conflicts prevails due to 
information asymmetry. In this vein, Byoun (2016) reported alike findings for US 
firms and report that firms with gender diverse boards are more likely to smooth 
their dividend policy because these firms exhibit lower agency cost.  
 
Board gender diversity is one of a common phenomenon used in most of the 
emerging markets and it has significant impact on financial decisions like dividend 
payout ratio made by board of directors (Bebchuk et al., 2009).  It is also observed 
that as compare to male directors, female directors are more ethical, which leads 
smoothness of dividends and curtailing of agency conflict on one side and strengthen 
better relation among management and stockholders on the other side (Ararat et al., 
2015; Suryanto et al., 2017). The stakeholders can reduce agency cost by increasing 
proportion of female directors in the board. Similarly, it is evidenced that boards 
with female directors have more effective monitoring mechanism as compare to the 
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boards with male directors and more female directors in the board strengthen the 
corporate governance and dividend smoothing practices (Rozeff, 1982). On the basis 
of above literature, the following relation is expected: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The board diversity has a significant positive influence on the 
dividend smoothing behavior of firms in emerging markets. 
 
3.2.3 Ownership Structure and Dividend Smoothing 
A concentrated ownership structure can help to reduce the agency conflicts, since 
greater monitoring efforts by large shareholders is a key feature of concentrated 
ownership (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In contrasts, ownership concentration also 
has costs that can lead to the expropriation of minority rights (La Porta et al., 1999), 
with perhaps negative outcomes on firm’s performance. Ownership structure 
emerges as an important factor that could influence on various financial decisions 
taken by the firms including dividend payments. When the legal environment does 
not provide sufficient protection for outside investors, entrepreneurs and original 
owners are forced to maintain large positions in their companies which results in 
concentration of firm ownership (La Porta et al., 2000; Mori and Ikeda, 2015). The 
ownership pattern whether it is institutional or family determines the control and 
influence of shareholders in the firm (Mehboob et al., 2015).   
 
3.2.4 Family Ownership and Dividend Smoothing 
Family ownership is characterized as that the firm is controlled and managed by 
family members (Kraiczy, 2013). There are two schools of thought regarding role of 
family ownership. First school declare family ownership as a mechanism to reduce 
agency conflicts resulting from information asymmetry, hence, resulting in better 
performance and alignment of resources. In such firms, the board of directors 
remains under scrutiny of family ownership and interest of both group is better 
aligned. The second school states that in family owned firms, the rights of minority 
shareholders are less protected and management is reluctant to distribute dividends.  
 
Based on these schools of thought, we also find two controversial findings in 
literature. Some views the presence of family ownership is a positive determinant of 
dividend smoothing (Weisskopf, 2010; Saerang and Pontoh 2016). On the other 
hand, the literature highlights that family owned firms pay lower dividends to the 
minority shareholders and retain more amount of free cash flow for their personal 
benefits (De Cesari, 2012; Suryanto and Thalassinos, 2017)). There are less 
independent directors appointed by family owned firms as compared to the firms 
owned by non-family shareholders, which shows a negative impact of family owned 
firms on board independence in Malaysia in the research of Leung et al. (2014). 
However, the current study considers positive view and develops the following 
hypothesis: 
  
Hypothesis 4: Family ownership has a significant positive influence on the dividend 
smoothing behavior of firms in emerging markets. 
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3.2.5 Institutional Ownership and Dividend Smoothing 
Since institutions (e.g., mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds, and private 
equity firms) often occupy a significant portion of money at their disposal, they are 
always welcomed by the equity market and their role is more pronounced than any 
other type of investor. They are considered as a mechanism to reduce the agency 
conflict because their vocally stated benefits are aligned with those of smaller 
stockholders. These institutions generally purchase large blocks of a company's 
outstanding shares and can exert considerable influence upon its management (Celik 
and Isaksson, 2014). Institutional ownership play an influential role in financial 
decision making process, firms having large institutional participation provide 
higher dividends to shareholders due to the dominant role of institutional 
shareholders, in light of institutional theory (Thanatawee, 2013). In most of the 
emerging economies, policies made by board of directors are influenced by directly 
institutional investors. The following relationship is expected on the basis of the 
above literature: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Institutional ownership has a significant positive influence on the 
dividend smoothing behavior of  firms in emerging markets. 
 
3.2.6  Control Factors 
The study used firms’ characteristics such as market to book value, cash to total 
assets, firms’ age and firms’ size as control variables. The market to book ratio is 
used to find the value of a company by comparing the market value of a firm to its 
book value. The operating cash flow to total assets ratio is a financial metric that can 
be used to quantify such benefits. This ratio measures the amount of operating cash 
flow that is generated for every dollar of assets that is owned. Firm size can be 
measured with the help of various proxies such as total assets of the firm, total sales 
of the firm, number of employees, market capitalization, etc. The firm age is 
measured by the natural logarithm of the number of years since it was listed for the 
first time on stock exchange.  
 
4. Research Methodology 
 
The main objective of the study is to evaluate the effect of corporate governance and 
ownership structure on the dividend smoothing behavior in emerging markets. The 
sample comprised of a total of 1020 firms from emerging economies including 
Pakistan (145), India (438), Sri Lanka (125), Malaysia (160) and Singapore (152). 
These countries are selected on the basis of some common economic characteristics 
and their recognition as important emerging countries in Asia. The sample consists 
of non-financial firms listed on stock exchanges of the above-mentioned Asian 
countries. The financial institutions are excluded from the sample due to the 
differences between both types of firms. Here, we follow the sampling criteria of 
Fama and French (1992), as they suggest excluding financial firms from samples 
because they are normally high leveraged. Data related to corporate governance and 
ownership structure are compiled from the annual reports published in the public 
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disclosure platforms and firms’ official websites. For gender diversity, we follow the 
financial report of each firm and the names of CEO and other board members are 
matched with their photos published in reports to avoid any conflicts. The definition 
and calculation of each variable is mentioned in appendix A. The sample period for 
this study extends from 2009 to 2018. The panel data analysis assists in investigating 
time-series as well as cross-sectional data simultaneously. Speed of adjustment is 
used as a measure of dividend smoothing and it is considered a dependent variable in 
this study. Corporate governance (board size, board diversity) and ownership 
structure (family ownership, institutional ownership) are used as independent 
variables in the current study. The study used firm’s characteristics (market to book 
ratio, cash reserves available to firm, size and age of the firms) as control variables.  
 
The study used panel data procedures due to the fact that the sample contains data 
across firms, countries and over time. According to Baltagi (2005), utilization of 
panel data is more informative, more efficient, and has more degrees of freedom and 
less collinearity among variables. Fixed Effect and Random Effect models are the 
most famous techniques used for panel data analysis. The decision regarding the 
application of Fixed or Random Effect models is based on the Hausman test (1978). 
The general form of a panel regression model can be expressed as: 
 
 
 
where i and t represent the firm and time, respectively, Y is the dependent variable 
which is a measure of dividend smoothing, β0 is a scalar, β1 is K × 1 and Xit is the 
ith observation on K explanatory variables. Here, ꜫ i,t is an error term for i, firms 
and t time. The extended model for corporate governance and ownership structure of 
the study is expressed as: 
  
 
 
Authors will follow the statistical techniques recommendations from Bhatti, Haque, 
and Osborn (2013) to evaluate the impact of corporate governance and ownership 
structure on dividend smoothing, the panel data analysis will be applied for this 
purpose.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 1 explains descriptive statistics for all the selected firms, including firm’ 
specifics, corporate governance, and ownership structure variables. The results show 
that the average dividend per share is 8.2874 and ranges from -23.442 to 1857.81, 
shows large differences in dividend per share paid by the firms. The average value of 
market to book value is 0.6320 and ranges from 0.0090 to 18.600. This shows large 
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variation between the markets to book values of various firms. Cash available to 
total assets has an average value of 0.8280 and ranges from 0.0041 to 22.587, 
showing significant variation of cash available to total assets among firms. 29.8206 
is the average value of firm age, while minimum and maximum values of firm age 
are 7.02573 and 122.00, respectively. The average size of the firm is 26.8594 and 
ranges from 5.9930 to 121.00, which shows large variation in firm size. Table 1 also 
shows different characteristics of corporate governance. The average value of the 
board of directors is 12.399 while the maximum and minimum values are 22.000 and 
3.000, respectively. This shows significant differences between the board sizes of 
various firms. 0.594371 is the average value of board diversity, while it ranges from 
0.00 to 1.00. The average value of family ownership is 63.014, while its minimum 
and maximum values are 4.000 and 676.00 respectively. Institutional ownership has 
an average value of 12.579 while it ranges from 1.000 to 1413, which shows 
significant variation. Some of the variables related to ownership structure are also 
explained in the following Table 1. 
 
 Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
  DPS MTB CTA SIZE AGE BD BS FO IS 
  Mean 8.29 0.63 0.83 26.86 29.82 0.59 12.40 63.01 12.58 
  Median 8.29 0.63 0.83 26.86 29.82 0.59 12.40 63.01 12.58 
 Maximum 16.81 18.60 22.59 121.00 122.00 1.00 22.00 676.00 1413.00 
 Minimum 3.44 0.01 0.00 5.99 7.03 0.00 3.00 4.00 1.00 
 Std. Dev. 7.52 1.00 0.58 21.17 23.04 0.49 1.02 10.38 14.34 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
5.2 Correlation Analysis 
Correlations among variables are expressed in Table 2. The correlation analysis is 
used to identify the presence of multicollinearity among firms’ specific 
characteristics, corporate governance, ownership structure and dividends paid by 
firms. The results show that all correlation coefficients are small and most are less 
than 0.80, which shows no issue of multicollinearity among variables (Lewis-Beck, 
1993). 
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
    DPS       MTB        CTA       SIZE     AGE      BD      BS      FO        IS 
  DPS 1.000 -0.006 0.0476 0.0906 -0.0668 -0.0094 0.0172 0.0136 -0.011 
MTB  1.000 0.1143 0.0317 -0.0311 0.0411 0.0224 0.0323 0.0182 
 CTA   1.000 0.039 -0.084 -0.031 -0.037 -0.017 -0.007 
SIZE    1.000 -0.589 -0.026 0.262 -0.036 0.010 
AGE     1.000 0.016 -0.222 0.028 -0.011 
  BD      1.000 -0.004 0.053 -0.009 
  BS       1.000 -0.046 0.001 
  FO        1.000 0.002 
  IS         1.000 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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5.3 Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Dividend Smoothing 
 
Table 3 shows the relation among different variables used in the study. Corporate 
governance includes board diversity and board size. Board diversity has a significant 
inverse (-1.367) at 1% level of significance, but it has no effect on dividend 
smoothing when there are 2 female directors included in the board, but board 
diversity has significant positive impact (0.596) at 1% level of significance on 
dividend smoothing due to the existence of 3 female directors in the board while 
board size has no effect on dividend smoothing behavior of firms in emerging 
markets.  
 
Ownership structure is another independent variable that is explained by the 
following Table 3. It includes institutional and family ownership. Institutional 
ownership has no impact on the dividend smoothing behavior of firms, while family 
ownership has a significant positive impact (0.099) at 10% level of significance on 
the dividend smoothing behavior of firms. This shows that in emerging markets, 
family firms pay smooth dividends to minority shareholders. The moderating role of 
board diversity and family ownership is also explained in Table 3. Moderating role 
of board diversity and family ownership has a significant positive impact (0.587) at 
10% level of significance on dividend smoothing behavior, shows that firms 
smoothing their dividends is correlated with board diversity and family ownership. 
Firm characteristics are also expressed in Table 3.  Among other characteristics, 
market-to-book value and firm size have a significant effect on dividend smoothing 
behavior while cash to total assets and firm age have no impact on the dividend 
smoothing behavior of firms. 
    
Table 3. Determinants of Dividend Smoothing  
Dividend Smoothening  
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Corporate governance      
Board diversity (dummy) -1.367*** 0.325 -4.206 0.000 
Board diversity_2 (dummy) 0.231 0.183 1.263 0.362 
Board diversity_3 (dummy) 0.516*** 0.183 3.263 0.002 
Board size -0.245 0.470 -0.520 0.603 
Ownership structure      
Institutional ownership -0.313 0.220 -1.423 0.155 
Family ownership 0.099* 0.060 1.660 0.097 
Moderation Role      
Board diversity *family ownership 0.587*** 0.056 3.806 0.002 
Firm's characteristics      
market to book value 0.911** 0.421 2.165 0.030 
cash to total assets 0.188 1.370 0.138 0.891 
firm's size -0.634** 0.213 -2.972 0.003 
firm's age  0.058 8.025 0.007 0.994 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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5.4  Role of Male CEO and Female CEO and Dividend Smoothing  
 
Table 4 compares two groups of firms; firms with male CEOs and firms with female 
CEOs. Table 4 describes various factors including corporate governance, ownership 
structure, and firm specific characteristics. In firms with one female director, board 
diversity is significantly positive (0.047) effect on firms with a male CEO but 
inverse significantly effect (-0.0390) on firms with a female CEO. When there are 2 
female directors, board diversity has a significant positive effect (0.0161) at 5% 
level of significance on the dividend smoothing behavior of firms with male, but 
insignificant on firms with female CEOs. Similarly, with the presence of 3 female 
directors in the board, it has significant positive (0.186) impact at 1% level of 
significance on dividend smoothing behavior in firms with male CEO, while it has 
positive effect (0.181) at 5% level of significance on dividend smoothing in firms 
with female CEO. Different patterns of ownership are also describe in Table 4.  
 
Institutional ownership has a significant inverse (-0.113) effect on dividend 
smoothing at 10% level of significance in firms with male CEOs and no effect on the 
firms with female CEOs. Family ownership has a significant positive effect (0.099) 
at 5% level of significance on the dividend smoothing behavior of firms with male 
CEOs, it also has a significant positive effect (0.039) at 5% level of significance on 
the dividend smoothing behavior of firms with female CEOs, which show that 
family owned firms with male or female CEOs give smooth dividends to the 
minority shareholders in an Asian context.  
 
The moderating role of board diversity and family ownership has a significant 
positive (0.087) effect at 5% level of significance on the dividend smoothing 
behavior of firms with male CEOs and firms with female CEOs. This shows that 
family owned firms with female directors smooth their dividends given to minority 
shareholders in order to maintain their reputation in emerging markets. The relevant 
firm characteristics include market to book value, cash to total assets, firm size and 
firm age, as described in the following Table 4. Market to book value has a positive 
effect on the dividend smoothing in both type of firms. The data shows a positive 
trend of dividend smoothing rising with the market value of firm. Firm size has a 
negative effect on dividend smoothing.  This is shown by how firms with both male 
and female CEOs pay fewer dividends as the firms become mature in age. 
  
Table 4. Dividend Smoothing (Male CEO Versus Female CEO) 
Variable Firms with male CEO  Firms with female CEO 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std.Error 
Corporate governance      
Board diversity (dummy) 0.047* 0.325 -0.0390 0.0480 
Board diversity_2 (dummy) 0.0161** 0.183 0.993 0.9206 
Board diversity_3 (dummy) 0.186*** 0.133 0.181** 1.3702 
Board size -0.245 0.470 0.0998 0.1601 
Ownership structure      
Institutional ownership -0.113* 0.220 -0.015 0.6114 
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Family ownership 0.099** 0.460 0.039** 0.2480 
Moderating Role      
Board diversity * Family ownership 0.087** 0.325 0.188* 0.3702 
Firm's characteristics      
Market to book value 0.111* 0.421 0.099** 0.0601 
Cash to total assets 0.188 1.370 -0.6342 1.2134 
Firm's size -0.634** 0.213 -0.051** 0.2254 
Firm's age  0.058 8.025 -2.5935 0.6114 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications  
 
The results indicate an impact of various factors of corporate governance and 
different patterns of ownership structure. Among other factors of corporate 
governance, board diversity has significant positive impact on dividend smoothing 
behavior of both firms. This relationship persists for both male and female CEOs. 
Hence, we can conclude that gender presence reduces agency conflicts by positively 
influencing dividend smoothing behavior of firms. This is in line with the female 
aspects that they are more ethical in nature. However, we provide evidence in favor 
of critical mass theory because the presence of one female serves as tokenism in the 
corporate board. Our findings also show negative relation between dividend 
smoothing and presence of one female on the corporate which is in line with the 
view that their fewer presence serve as token. So, the study significantly contributes 
in context of agency theory and gender critical mass maxim in Asian context.  
 
However, when we include gender diversity as interaction term between family 
ownership and dividend smoothing, the findings shows that it weakens the relation 
between them. Based on the viewpoint, we can further conclude that gender 
diversity role does not moderate the relationship between family ownership and firm 
dividend smoothing.  
 
Among other patterns of ownership structure, family ownership has significant 
positive impact on dividend smoothing behavior in both types of firms with male 
and female CEOs. The result highlights that family owned firms smooth dividends 
towards targeted dividends for maintaining their reputation. While institutional 
ownership has significant inverse effect on dividend smoothing behavior of firms 
with male CEO, while no effect in firms with female CEO. Based on these findings, 
we can conclude that higher family ownership leads to dividend smoothing behavior 
of the Asian firms.  
 
The study strongly recommends the presence of gender critical mass to reduce the 
agency conflicts among Asian firm. For the purpose, the authorities are required to 
force a significant portion of gender on the corporate board and mere a woman will 
serve as token. At the same, the findings depict that board interlock serve as negative 
determinant of divided smoothing. This may have impact on board independence 
   Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure and Dividend Smoothing:  
The Mediating Role of Family Ownership and Board Diversity in Emerging Markets 
 212  
 
 
also that may be the reason of insignificant association between board independence 
and dividend smoothing.    
 
However, it is important to mention the limitations of this study. First, the study only 
focuses on non-financial firms. Second, the study only used data from five Asian 
countries. For further research, the effect of investor legal protection on the dividend 
smoothing behavior of Asian countries because investor legal protection varies in 
various Asian countries, can be studied to provide in-depth information to investors.   
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Appendix A: Variables and Their Definitions 
Variable   Measurement  References  
Board diversity_1 (dummy) Female director present in the board                         Byoun (2016) 
Board diversity_2 (dummy)  2 female directors in the board Ararat et al., (2015) 
Board diversity_3 (dummy) 3 female directors in the board Ararat et al., (2015) 
Board size  Total number of directors in the board Bokpin (2011) 
Institutional ownership Percentage of shares hold by institutions 
Celik & Isaksson, 
(2014). 
Family ownership Percentage of shares hold by family members Leung et al., (2014). 
Market to book value Market value of equity/book value of equity Momoh, (2017)  
Cash to total assets Cash reserve to total assets Keythman (2018) 
Firm's size Total assets of the firm 
Ball and Foster, 
(1982) 
Firm's age  
No. of years since firm first time appeared in 
the stock exchange 
Ilaboya and 
Ohiokha (2016). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
